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Abstract:  
 
In this paper, we develop an optimal control model of labor allocation in two types of 
economy − one economy is for innovative workers and the other one for knowledge workers. 
In both economies, workers allocate time between learning and discovering new knowledge. 
Both markets consist of a continuum of heterogeneous agents that are distinguished by their 
learning ability. Workers are rewarded for the knowledge they possess in the knowledge 
economy, and only for the new knowledge they create in the innovative economy. We show 
that, at steady state, while human capital accumulation is higher in the knowledge economy, 
the rate of knowledge creation is not necessarily higher in the innovative economy. Secondly, 
we prove that when the cost of learning is sufficiently high, the distribution of net wage 
income in the knowledge economy dominates that in the innovative economy in the first 
degree. 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Considering the following dilemma of career choice faced by a PhD graduate. The graduate is 
offered jobs in a research-oriented university and in a teaching-oriented university, respectively. 
In the research university, her salary is linked to her research output. She can allocate time 
between knowledge learning (e.g. reading the literature) and knowledge creation (e.g. writing 
research papers). Learning will broaden her knowledge base and thus enhance her research 
ability. But she will be rewarded by how much new knowledge she creates, not by how much 
knowledge she possesses. 
On the other hand, in the teaching university, the graduate’s salary depends on her teaching 
performance, which is positively related to the amount of knowledge she possesses. While 
creating new knowledge is not directly rewarded, it, nevertheless, will enrich her knowledge 
base. Therefore, she still may allocate a certain amount of time to knowledge creation. 
Suppose the income distribution in each university depends on the distribution of its academics’ 
ability. The question this paper attempts to answer is that, if the fresh graduate is not sure about 
her ability compared to her peer academics, in which university will she be better off as far as 
income is concerned? In other words, can we rank the income distributions of the teaching 
university and the research university and on what will the ranking depend? 
The implication of the dilemma will become clearer when one considers the two universities 
described above as miniatures of two polar “knowledge-based economies.” In one economy, 
workers are rewarded for their innovations only, whereas in the other, workers are rewarded 
according to their knowledge capacity. We term the former an “innovative economy” and the 
latter a “knowledge economy,” and the workers in the two economies “innovative workers” and 
“knowledge workers,” respectively. Thus, the graduate’s dilemma can be generalized into a 
thesis about comparing the income distributions between the two types of knowledge-based 
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economy. The policy implication of the analysis is underpinned by the fact that the cost of 
learning plays a key role in determining the result. 
Recently, the idea of knowledge-based economies has captured the attention of policy makers, 
business leaders and academics. The OECD defines knowledge-based economies as: “…those 
which are directly based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information” 
(OECD 1996). Nevertheless, such a definition is rather imprecise.1 For instance, both teaching 
and research can be equally considered as knowledge-based jobs. Notwithstanding this, the 
graduate’s dilemma indicates that the specific nature of a knowledge-based economy could have 
important implications for human capital accumulation, income distribution and, consequently, 
social welfare. What distinguishes this paper from others in the literature is precisely its 
differentiated treatment of different types of knowledge-based economy. 
The main intellectual heritage that the paper is built upon is human capital theory. Human capital 
theory has had a major influence on the theory of personal income distribution. Seminal papers 
include Blinder and Yoram (1976), Becker (1975) and Ben-Porath (1967); for more recent 
publications, see Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Mincer (1997) and Neal and Rosen (2000). 
However, the application of human capital theory to the study of income distribution has been 
criticized by Ramser (1987, p. 43) on three grounds: (1) the human capital concept is not 
operational; (2) the individual decision problem is usually formulated in a much too restrictive 
way; and (3) institutional aspects regarding the impact of investment in human capital on the 
distribution of income are largely ignored. In particular, Ramser (1987, p. 44) criticizes an 
overemphasis on the productivity function of human capital, to the neglect of the information 
function of human capital. 
                                                 
 
1  Empirically, OECD (1999) and APEC (2000) attempt to use a wide-range of indicators to measure to what extent 
their member countries have advanced towards a knowledge economy. 
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The model presented in this paper addresses these criticisms to some extent. Regarding the first 
point, whilst the human capital concept itself is not operational, a human capital theory that leads 
to the analytic derivation of income distributions is, in principal operational. For instance, if 
individual income data are available, the derived distributions could be fitted to the data using 
maximum likelihood techniques. 
Regarding the last two points, our model emphasizes the interaction between learning from an 
existing knowledge base and the discovery of new knowledge, as well as the payment function 
which is related to the institutional setting. We have expanded the range of individual choices 
usually considered, and have attempted to focus not just on the productivity function of human 
capital, but also on its role in generating new knowledge. 
The model presented here extends Stiglitz’s (1975) work to take into account dynamic 
accumulation of human capital, and discovery of new knowledge, and to compare the 
distribution of income in different institutional scenarios which we term “economies.” It, 
therefore, also lies well within the tradition of so-called public income distribution theories 
(Sahota 1978). 
Models in new growth theory do capture the discovery of new knowledge in the form of new 
products or research output that are able to be protected by patents and copyrights (Grossman 
and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1998). However innovation and the creation of new 
knowledge often occur as a result of workers addressing new problems that emerge as part of 
their daily activities. For example, managerial staff need to provide new solutions to new 
problems that arise as company or market conditions change; these new ideas are usually unable 
to be copyrighted. Furthermore, much knowledge created by academics is also not protected by 
copyright or patent. In this respect, our model considers an aspect of innovation that is not 
considered traditionally in the new growth theory. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic set up of the 
model. Sections 3 and 4 derive the analytical solutions for the innovative economy and the 
knowledge economy, respectively. Section 5 applies stochastic dominance theory to compare the 
income distributions of the two economies. Section 6 concludes. 
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BASIC MODEL SETTING 
In this section, we sketch out the basic setting that is common to the two types of economies.2 
The next two sections will add features that distinguish the two economies. 
In both economies, workers allocate time between knowledge learning and knowledge creating. 
The dynamics of knowledge accumulated through learning is given by: 
( ( )LK T d Hπ= +& )
0>
                                                
 (1) 
where  is the stock of learned knowledge; T  is the time devoted to learning;  is the 
efficiency of learning, which may be equated to the ability of individuals; and d H  is the 
“efficiency dividend” of investment in human capital. 
LK π
)(
Efficiency dividend d H  is a linear function of accumulated human capital : ( ) H
;d Hφ φ= . (2) 
As will be seen below, workers are heterogeneous in term of having different values of . 
However, we assume that each worker knows her own value of ; therefore  is treated as a 
predetermined and hence deterministic variable rather than a stochastic variable in the worker’s 
optimization problem. While  is given,  is an endogenous function of previously 
accumulated human assets (see below). A more knowledgeable person will be more efficient in 
learning (and creation). Furthermore, a more efficient learner will need a smaller amount of 
effort or time to learn a given amount of knowledge. 
π
π π
π d
 
 
2 Strictly speaking, what we model are merely two labor markets, as we do not explicitly model the production side. 
But “knowledge labor market” sounds a little awkward to us. 
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The dynamics of accumulation of knowledge through discovery (i.e. knowledge creation) is 
described by: 
(1 ) ( )DK T d= −& H  (3) 
where  is the stock of created knowledge. The total time available is normalized to one, so 
the amount of time spent on making discovery is equal to (1 . 
DK
)T−
The dynamics of human capital accumulation is governed by: 
( )L DH K K H T d H Hδ π δ= + − = + −& & & . (4) 
Both learned and discovered knowledge contribute to the accumulation of human capital. On the 
other hand, human capital depreciates continuously because of both internal and external 
reasons. Individuals have a tendency to forget overtime, especially with increased age. In 
addition, previously learned knowledge will become obsolete as new knowledge emerges, or as a 
result of changes in the social environment. For instance, the knowledge of using typewriters was 
rendered redundant when computers became the standard office typesetting equipment. 
Since d enters both (1) and (3), it means that a higher level of human capital will give rise to 
higher efficiency in both learning and creation. Furthermore, when human capital level is equal 
to zero, the worker will be unable to make any discovery. However, she will still be able to learn. 
In other words, creation must be based on existing knowledge. 
We assume that: (a) the time workers spent on leisure is fixed, and (b) there is a perfect financial 
market. As a result, consumption-investment decision and time allocation decision (over learning 
and creation) can be separated, and we can model the worker’s decision-making process as an 
income maximization problem instead of a utility maximization problem. A merit of this 
specification is that the analysis can be isolated from elements about the distribution of initial 
wealth. 
The problem faced by a given innovative worker is to: 
Maximize   0
   subject tortY e dt
∞ −∫
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Y W pT= −  (5) 
( )H Hφ δ π= − +& T
)
<
)D&
 (6) 
where  is the net wage income; W is wage income, those specification is stated below;  is 
the cost of learning, such as tuition fee. The time subscript is omitted for notational clearness. 
Y p
Briefly, (5) states that net wage income is equal to wage income minus the cost of learning. 
Equation (6) describes the dynamics of human capital, and is obtained by substituting (2) into (4)
. 
The stability of the system requires the following assumption. 
Assumption 1: . δ φ>
 
INNOVATIVE ECONOMY 
In an innovative economy, an innovative worker is rewarded for the amount of new knowledge 
she produces per period: 
( DW f K= &  (7) 
where  is a wage function. (.)f
Equation (7) can be interpreted as that, in our graduate example, the wage earned by an academic 
in a research university depends on how many publications she produces every year. 
To the extent that knowledge is not a (standardized) commodity, the innovative worker should 
face a downward sloping demand curve, i.e. . Here we specify the wage 
function as 
'(.) 0, "(.) 0f f>
( ) ln(D Df K w K=&  (8) 
where  is a parameter. Dw
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1.1 Analytical Solution 
Substituting (8) into (5), then we can formulate the current value Hamiltonian of the optimization 
problem as: 
[ ] [ln (1 ) ( )Dw T H pT HΛ φ λ φ δ= − − + − + ]Tπ
p
/ H
 
where T  is the control variable,  the state variable,  the costate variable. H λ
Besides the original constraints, the other first order conditions are 
/(1 )Dw Tλπ = − +  (9) 
( ) Dr wλ δ φ λ= + − −& . (10) 
The steady state solutions for  and  are: H T
1/ 22 2 2
1 2 2 1
2
1 2 2 41
2 (
D
D D
w rH
p r
w wr
p r p r
δ φ π
δ φ δ φ
δ φ π π
δ φ δ φ δ φ δ φ
     + −= +     + − −     
          + − ± + −          + − − − + −          
%
)( )   (11) 
1/ 22
1 2 2 1
2
1 2 2 4( )1 .
2 (
D
D D
w rT
p r
w wr
p r p r
δ φ
δ φ
δ φ δ φ
δ φ δ φ
   + −= +   + −   
        + − − ± + −        + − + −       
%
)   (12) 
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Since the terms inside the squared-root bracket in both equations are positive,  and T  have 
two positive real solutions:  and ( ) ; .
H%
1>
%
( )* *,H T ** **,H T ** *H H> 3  However, T , violating the 
constraint of non-negative time allocation in either learning or creation. Therefore, only  
is the only feasible solution. The feasible equilibrium human capital and net wage income are: 
**
( )* *,H T
*
1/ 22 2 2
1 2 2 1
2
1 2 2 41
2 (
D
D D
w rH
p r
w wr
p r p r
δ φ π
δ φ δ φ
δ φ π π
δ φ δ φ δ φ δ φ
     + −= +     + − −     
          + − − + −          + − − − + −          )( ) 
* π
X
π
w
                                                
 (13) 
{ }* * *ln 1 ( )( / ) ( )( / )DY w H H p Hφ δ φ π δ φ = − − − −  . (14) 
In order to examine the stability of the system, we substitute (9) into (6) and (10) to obtain two 
dynamic equations that characterize the system 
( ) /DH H wφ δ π= − + −&  (15) 
/ ( ) ( ) /DX w H r X p rδ φ δ φ π= − + + − + + −&  (16) 
where .  / /[(1 ) ]DX p w Tλ π= − = −
Since 1 , we have . * 0, 0,and 0DT π> > > > * 0X >
 
 
φ
)
3 In the case of free-education, i.e. , the two solutions collapse into one:  and 
. Note that to obtain the solution, substitute  into the first order conditions, 
instead of directly into (11) and (12). 
0p = * /( 2 2 )H rπ δ= + −
* ( ) /( 2 2T rδ φ δ φ= − + − 0p =
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Around the steady state, the system can be linearized into 
*2 *
*2 *
/
/
D
D
w XH H
w H r X XX
φ δ
δ φ
    − −    =         + − −   
&
&
H
 . (17) 
Let the solutions for the characteristic equation to be  and1µ  2µ , then 
2 *
1 2
4( )( )[ /( )]
,
2
Dr r r w X Hδ φ δ φµ µ ± + − + −=
* 2
0
                                                
. (18) 
Since  and  are real, both roots are real, and . That is, the steady state is a saddle 
point.
*X *H 1 2 0µ µ <
4 
Proposition 1: In the innovative economy, the lower the cost of learning, the higher the 
efficiency of knowledge creation, and the higher an individuals ability, the higher the 
equilibrium level of human capital. 
Proof: Using (13), it is straightforward to compute the following comparative statics results: 
; ∂ ∂ ; and ∂ ∂ . * / 0H p∂ ∂ < * /H φ > * / 0H π >
 
Proposition 2: In the innovative economy, the lower the cost of learning the higher, the 
efficiency of knowledge creation, and the higher an individual’s ability, the higher the 
equilibrium rate of knowledge creation. 
 
 
)4 The other steady state solution ( , while infeasible, is also a saddle point. ** **,H T
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Proof: Using (2) and (3), the equilibrium rate of knowledge creation is given by: 
. Making use of Proposition 1 and noting that 1 2 , 
gives the following comparative statics results: ; ∂ ∂ ; and . 
( ) *1 /DK Hδ φ π φ= − −& *H ( ) * /Hδ φ π> −
/ 0DK π∂ ∂ >&/ 0DK p∂ ∂ <& / 0DK φ >&
 
If accumulation of human capital and knowledge creation by individuals results in externalities 
to the economy, such as better citizens or knowledge spillovers, our results suggest subsidizing 
education. 
 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
In a knowledge economy, a worker is paid according to her productivity, which is positively 
related to her stock of human capital: 
lnHW w H=  (19) 
where  is a parameter. Here we, again, assume that the worker faces a downward sloping 
labor demand curve. 
Hw
Substituting (19) into (5), we obtain another optimal control problem. The steady state solution 
for which is given by: 
# HwH
p r
π
δ φ
 =   + − 
  (20) 
# HwT
p r
δ φ
δ φ
  −=   + − 
  (21) 
# ln HH
wY w w
p r r
π δ
δ φ δ φ
     −= −    + − + −      H
φ  . (22) 
 
11 
 
Proposition 3: In the knowledge economy the lower the cost of learning the higher the 
efficiency of knowledge creation, and the higher an individuals ability the higher the equilibrium 
level of human capital. 
Proof: Using (20), it can be easily computed that: , , and . # / 0H p∂ ∂ < # /H φ∂ ∂ > 0
0
D
*H
# / 0H π∂ ∂ >
 
Proposition 4: In the knowledge economy the lower the cost of learning the higher the  
efficiency of knowledge creation, and the higher an individuals learning ability the higher the 
equilibrium rate of knowledge creation. 
Proof: The proof is essentially that same as that of Proposition 2. Making use of Proposition 3, 
we can compute that: ∂ ∂ ; ; and ∂ ∂ . / 0DK p <& /DK φ∂ ∂ >& / 0DK π >&
 
Proposition 5: If , the equilibrium human capital level of a worker will be higher in the 
knowledge economy than in the innovative economy, but the result for the equilibrium rate of 
knowledge creation is ambiguous. 
Hw w=
Proof: Using (13) and (20), it is easy to show that . The difference in the rates of 
knowledge creation is equal to: . Factorizing, it 
gives: . The sign of  is 
ambiguous. For instance, if  is very large relative to  and , the term can be positive; that 
is, a worker may have a higher rate of knowledge creation in the knowledge economy than in the 
innovative economy. 
# * 0H H− >
# # 1 (H Hφ − −
Hw Dw
*1 ( ) / ) /Hδ φ π δ φ π φ  − − −  
# *)( ) /H Hφ π +  1 ( )(δ φ− −# *( ) 1 (H Hφ δ− − −
p
# *) /H H π + 
 
STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE ANALYSIS 
In order to address the question raised in the introduction as to which institution the fresh PhD 
graduate should choose it is necessary to compare the net income distributions of the knowledge 
and innovative economies. To do this we employ stochastic dominance analysis. Stochastic 
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dominance analysis allows one to compare distributions and rank them without specific reference 
to utility functions.  
Definition 1 (First Order Stochastic Dominance): 
If for all , and the inequality is strict over some interval, the distribution  
exhibits first-order stochastic dominance over . This indicates that the distribution  will lie 
everywhere to the right of the distribution . A consequence of first-order stochastic dominance 
is that any risk-averse individual with positive marginal utility of income, will prefer  to G  
(Hirshleifer and Riley 1992, p. 106). 
c )()( cGcF ≤ F
G F
F
G
 
1.2 Distribution of Net Wage Income 
In order to derive income distributions, we require the following assumption. 
Assumption 2: is uniformly distributed with unit interval support. π
Lemmas 1 and 2 derive these distributions of net wage income for the two types of worker based 
on Assumption 2 and the results in the previous section. Proposition 6 relates to stochastic 
dominance of net wage income. 
Lemma 1: The distribution of net wage income for the innovative workers is given by 
( ) [ ]
1 (exp
1 ( )D D D
Y pP Y y
Z Z w w
δ φ
δ φ φ
 −≤ = + − − 
) Z
 . (23) 
where  is the probability that the net wage income Y  is less than or equal to ; ( )DP Y y≤ y
1/ 22 2
1 2 2 11
2
1 2 2 1 41 .
2 (
D D
Z
w wr
p r p r
δ φ
δ φ δ φ
δ φ
δ φ δ φ δ φ δ φ
   + −= +   + − −   
         + − − + −         + − − −          )( )
Dw r
p r
   
    + −
 
Proof: From (13) one obtains: Z H .  * /π=
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Substituting this into (14) yields: Y w . [ ]{ }ln 1 ( ) ( )D Z Z p Zφ π δ φ δ φ= − − − −
Inverting (14) gives: [ ]
1 (exp
1 ( ) D D
Y p
Z Z w w
δ φπ δ φ φ
 −= + − −  
) Z . 
By Assumption 2, is uniformly distributed with unit interval support. As  varies across 
workers in the economy, so will be Y . So now we can treat Y  as a random variable in the 
economy, and that Y . Let us define  as the realization of Y . Using Assumption 2, the 
probability distribution of Y  is given by: 
π π
[0, )∈ ∞
[ ]
y
( ) 1 (+ ) ZexpD
D D
Y pP Y y
Z Z w w
δ φπ φ
−≤ = =
1 ( )δ φ− −
   
. 
 
Lemma 2: The distribution of net wage income for the knowledge workers is given by:  
( )( ) expH
H H
r p YP Y y
w w r
δ φ δ φ
δ φ
+ −  −≤ = + + −  . (24) 
Proof: Inverting (22) gives ( ) exp
H H
r p Y
w w r
δ φ δ φπ δ φ
+ −  −= + + − 
Z
] /
; and then apply the argument 
in the proof of Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 3: / 0∂ ∂ , where V Z . V p < [ ]1 ( )δ φ φ= − −
Proof: . From Proposition 1 
we have ∂ ∂ . Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that [ ] . 
Therefore, ∂ ∂ . 
( )[ ] ( )[*/ / 1 2( ) / 1 2( )V p Z p Z H p Zδ φ φ δ φ φ π∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ − − = ∂ ∂ − −
* / 0H p <
/ 0V p <
1 2( ) 0Zδ φ− − >
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Proposition 6: The distribution of net wage incomes of knowledge workers stochastically 
dominates that of innovative workers in the first degree if  is sufficiently large. p
Proof: The distribution of net wage income of knowledge workers stochastically dominates that 
of innovative workers in the first degree if . This implies that the 
following inequality condition needs to hold: 
( ) ( ),H DP Y y P Y y Y≤ < ≤ ∀
( )
[ ]
1 ( )exp exp ,
1 ( )H H D D
r p Y Y Y
w w r Z Z w w
δ φ δ φ δ φ
δ φ δ φ φ
+ −   − −+ < +  + − − −  
pZ  ∀ . (25) 
The term on the left hand side increases linearly with . Using Lemma 3, we also obtain that the 
term on the right hand side also increases with . However, as the term on the right hand side 
increases by more than exponentially, the inequality will hold for a sufficiently large . 
p
p
p
The result implies that, as far as income distribution is concerned, a higher learning cost will 
favor participants in the knowledge economy rather than those in the innovative economy. In our 
early example of academic jobs, if the graduate is risk averse and the cost of learning is 
sufficiently high, then she would prefer to accept the offer from the teaching university rather 
than an offer from a research university. 
A policy implication of our result is that, if knowledge creation is deemed to be critical to the 
long-term growth, policy makers may want to encourage workers to enter an innovative labor 
market instead of a knowledge labor market. However, if the cost of education is not low 
enough, then a condition for the income distribution of innovative workers to dominate that of 
knowledge workers is that  is large relative to  (as well as relative to  because of 
Proposition 5). This can be seen easily from the fact that in (25), if  decreases, while keeping 
other parameters including  constant, eventually the inequality will be reversed. 
Dw
Dw
Hw p
Hw
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examine income distribution issues regarding innovative workers versus 
knowledge ones, and the impact of the cost of learning on income distribution. 
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In the model, we have analyzed time allocation in two types of labor markets. In the innovative 
economy, workers are rewarded for the new knowledge they discover, while in the knowledge 
economy, workers are rewarded for the knowledge they have learnt, regardless whether it is 
newly generated or inherited. 
We prove that in the two economies, both human capital accumulation and the rate of knowledge 
creation increase with lower cost of learning, higher efficiency in creation, and higher efficiency 
in learning. The finding is largely consistent with the literature of human capital theory.  
However, we also show that while human capital accumulation is higher in the knowledge 
economy, the rate of knowledge creation is not necessarily higher in the innovative economy. 
For instance, if the cost of learning is sufficiently high, workers in the knowledge economy could 
have a higher rate of knowledge creation than those in the innovative economy. 
Lastly, we have applied stochastic dominance analysis to the steady state income distributions 
derived from the optimal control problems of workers in each type of economies. This has 
allowed us to rank the income distributions of the two types of workers. We have established that 
if learning is costly, then innovative workers will be worse off than their knowledge counterparts 
in terms of first-degree stochastic dominance. 
The research can be extended in a number of directions. Firstly, in our model workers are not 
allowed to choose which type of labor market they supply their labor to. A possible extension is 
to endogenize the choice of job, allowing workers to self-sort into either type of market 
according to their learning ability, e.g. Sattinger (1975). This approach will lead to the pooling 
and separating equilibrium in labor market screening models. Secondly, this paper assumes a 
wage function for each type of economy. A more comprehensive analysis should incorporate the 
production side and, hence, provide a foundation for the wage equations. Such a general 
equilibrium approach will be warranted if one wants to compare the long- term growth rates of 
the two types of knowledge-based economies. 
Finally, in the above analysis we treat  as a random variable, but no other parameters, such 
as and . One may suggest that the depreciation rate of knowledge and the efficiency in 
knowledge creation are also likely to vary across workers. Nonetheless, as Y  is not linear in both 
π
δ φ
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parameters, a closed form solution for the income distribution in terms of either  or  cannot 
be obtained. Pursuing this issue in the current setting therefore requires numerical simulation. 
δ φ
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